Concerning the first quest ion, economists have recently reappraised their assess ment. Whereas, following Joan Robinson's views, most economists (Schumpeter excepted) have long considered financial structures as passive factors, they tend now to believe that financial development does in fact affect the development of the real economy. This shift was initiated by historians interested in the economic devel 'r.... ntinpntal Europe and Japan (Cameron 1967; Gerschenkron 1962) . But followed by historians and economists diverged. Even though many recent historical works are sympathetic to the supply-side thesis that finance leads economic development (Sylla 1998) , debates on the origins of the industrial revolution or on the decline of leading nations show that this question has not yet found a dear solution among historians. During the same period, the finance-Ied growth school has become increasingly influential in the economics literature.
Since the seminal work by Goldsmith (1969) first established a positive corre lation between economic development and financial wealth or growth, ;~n~rt~n progress has been recorded in this fieId. Rigorous theoretical works have hlgnugn some of the channels through which the emergence of financial systems affects eco nomic growth. The contribution of financial contracts, markets, and institutions to reducing transaction and financial costs has been broken down into aseries of more basic functions (diversifying and pooling risk, producing information about possible investments and allocating resources, monitoring firms and exercising corporate control, mobilizing savings, facilitating the exchange of goods and services), each of whose influence on economic growth has been analyzed (Levine 1997) . In addition, a growing body ofempirical studies has investigated the problem of causality more deeply. Most of these works dearly demonstrate that efficient financial systems facilitate long-run economic growth (Rajan and Zingales
The existence or not of different kinds of financial systems is the second of debate. Corpora te finance patterns and the structure of the financial sector vary across countries. The very nature of the financial intermediaries also differs: spe cialized banks are restricted either to deposit and lending activities (deposit or com mercial banks) or to underwriting activities, securities trading, fund management, merger and take-over advice (investment banks); universal banks, by contrast, com bine the business activities of commercial and investment banks. In addition some universal banks (ordinary universal banks) engage in commercial and investment banking but do not exercise control over non-banks while some others (privileged ones) add to these activities the exercise of non-delilUlt control over non-banks through a doser formalized relationship such as equity holding, proxy voting, and board representation. Are these differences systematic? For the period from 1950 to 1980, an abundant literat ure describes financial systems as either bank-based, and relational or as market-based, specialized, and arm's length. Germany and Japan head up the first group, while the United States and UK head up the second. Is this c1assification suitable for other countries? For a number of scholars, the answer is negative. Using net f1ow-of-funds data instead of balance-sheet data, BANKING AND FINANCE 3 21 Colin Mayer, for instance, concludes that self-financing is dominant everywhere, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries, and that those differences which can be observed are inconsistent with the c1assical distinction between bank-based and market-based systems (Mayer 1988) . In fact the most plausible hypo thesis is that, even though the distinction be tween the two systems is overstylized and oversimplified, firms' financing pat terns do really difter and these differences are not unrelated to those observed in national financial systems. This is evident when the financing pattern is mea sured through gross financial tlows or through debt-equity ratios of domestic corporations (Table 14 .1). While according to the revisionist account, Germany, for instance, has the lowest leverage among the G-7 countries (along with the UK), on these measures, it c1early has a higher debt-equity ratio than the United States. Because of their dependence on bank finance, German firms figure among the most highly leveraged in the developed world; in spite of the role of bonds in their finance, US corporations, which rely more heavily on self-financing and equity issues, display the opposite pattern. More gene rally, where capital markets dominate the financial system, firms' debt-equity ratio is low (as in the Anglo Saxon countriesl; where bank lending prevails the debt-equity ratio is high (as in Continental Europe). Thus, with the exception of Japan, we can conclude that the distinction between US-style market-based finance and the German-style bank based pattern is not "inaccurate" (Hacketal and Schmidt 2004) .
These dilferences are also consistent with the prevailing pattern of banking organization. Table 14 .1 validates for 1990 the identification of universality with bank domination and specialization with market domination. The reason for this association may be that specialized banks and financial markets are unlikcly to devclop where universal banks prevail. Since the information acquired in the credit and deposit business is ofsignificant value to the investment business and vice versa, universal banks enjoy important information economies of scope that lead to the crowding out of the other kinds of banks. Without the support of investment financial markets are unable to devclop. Financial markets will also be affected by the growing tendency for universal banks to concentrate their business on lending; not only is this activity more profitable than the provision of underwriting services, but it also generates a stream of information rents, while the information gener ated by underwriting business is often firm-specific and loses its value after each transaction (DietI1998).
In this schema, Japan is a special case since it benefits from both a well-developed financial market and a strong banking sector. The key explanatory factor is the very specific organization of its banking sector. For historical reasons, universal banks did not develop in Japan during the second half of the twentieth century. Although Japanese commercial and trust banks did not engage in investment bank ing activities, they did massively acquire minority equity stakes in non-banks. On the one hand, the separation of commercial and investment banking allowed the growth of an important investment banking sector and a well-devcloped equity market. On the other hand, banks' holding of company shares opened the door to profitable long-term investment and governance rclationships with non-financial firms (DietlI998). Thus even though institut ions and systems are often difficult to categorize crlsply, strong connections can nonetheless be identified between firms' financing patterns, the predominance of financial markets versus bank lending, and the organization of the banking sector itself.
The explanation for these dilferences constitutes the third major area of debate. Many monocausal hypotheses have been suggested. Given the current obvious role ofstate policies, a number ofscholars consider that the driving force behind them is the role of incumbent interest groups. Thus, for Mark Roe, it is the relative strength of political support for stakeholders that determines the respective importance of banks and markets.ln Rajan and Zingales' account (2001) the incumbent interests (the landed gentry in the nineteenth century, industrialists and financiers in the mid-twentieth century) oppose financial development because it aids the entry of new c1asses or new firms. An increasingly influential stream of research contends that legal factors above all influence the present shape of financial systems. For La Porta et al. (1998) , the legal rules governing protection of corporate shareholders BAN KING AND FI NANCE 323 and creditors explain the organization of financial systems. The basic idea is that securities are not only defined by their cash flows as in the traditional finance model of Modigliani-Miller, but are also defined by the rights they confer on their owners. Where the legal rules protecting investors and the quality of their enforcement are strong (i.e. in common law countries), financial markets are likely to develop; where the legal system is weak (i.e. in civillaw countries), powerful financial institutions are needed to force firms to reveal information and to repay their debts. In a c10sely related approach, Helmut Dietl (1998) distinguishes between the highly stylized poles of neodassical (US) versus relational (Germany) regulation. Neodassical regulation is based on the theoretical assumption that perfeet markets efficiently allocate capital and is driven by the objective of eliminating market imperfections (such as ownership concentration, insider trading, market manipulations, Relational regulation focuses primarily on governance efficiency rather than alloca tive efficiency and is based on the idea that most neodassical market imperfections far from being harmful should be considered as a means of economizing on gov ernance costs. In this perspective, Japan is a "hybrid" model, with both relational elements (going back to the Meiji era), and neoclassical elements (introduced after World War II), which may account for both the size of its financial markets and the development ofits banking system. The relationship between financial structure and economic performance is the fourth area of debate among economists, wh ich focuses mainly on the relative mer its ofbank-based versus market-based financial systems. Several competing theses have been advanced (Levine 2002) . The bank-based viewemphasizes the advantages of such systems in mobilizing savings, identifying good investment projects, and exerting corporate control. In contrast, the market-based view holds that such systems are beUer for promoting long-run economic growth because markets do a belter job than banks at allocating capital and providing "key financial services that stimulate innovation". In addition, the former thesis stresses the shortcomings of market-oriented systems and the myopie investor climate generated by liquid markets, while the latter suggests that banks can inhibit innovation (by extract ing internal informational rents and protecting established firms) and impede efficient corporate governance. National economic growth patterns around 1990 allow no c1ear conclusion, since the best economic performances can be associated with each financial system. A third thesis, which may be termed the financial services view, minimizes the relevance of the previous debate, by cmphasizing the quality of services produced by the entire financial system. A fourth thesis contends that the relative merits of each financial system vary according to the context in which itoperates. Since banks and markets do not always provide the same kind of services, the relative position of each type of financial institution depends on its ability to adapt to the environment. For a number of scholars, banks outperform markets at low levels of economic development or when the financial sector isunderdeveloped, while countries would benefit from finance becoming more market-based at higher levels ofwealth. According to Dietl (1998) , "neoclassieal capital markets are an efficient form of allocating scarce capital within immature industries" (those which need common and scattered knowledge), while relational financial systems based on universal banking would "efficiently allocate scarce capital within mature industries" (those whieh need common and insider knowledge).
What is the contribution ofbusiness historv to these debates?
SELF-FINANCING
Since the early observations by Gurley and Shaw (1955) and Goldsmith (1969) , it is usual to consider that with economic development traditional sources of finance (self-financing, trade credit, credits from family, goldsmiths. scriveners, and attor tend to give way first to bank-intermediated debt finance (by commercial banks, then by specialized financial institutions) and later to the emergence of equity markets as additional intruments for raising funds. In this perspective, self financing has long been considered as a residual source (what firms can use when other sources offinance are lacking), which leads to a misallocation of capital. Self financing is supposed to characterize situations with poorly functioning financial systems (the early stage of industrialization or periods of economie crisis) and it is expected to diminish once the development of efficient financial institutions and markets enables firms to finance their investments from external sources. New developments in mieroeconomic theory since the 1980s have modified this point of view. Given market imperfel..1;ions (resulting in high transaction costs), self financing is now seen as one among aseries of alternative methods, the choiee between which depends on a comparison of their total costs and benefits. This perspective invites us to consider self-financing as a permanent source of finance for firms, as weIl as to evaluate its relative efficiency (Hautcoeur 1999) . This point of view is supported by historical evidence. A diachronie approach shows that in all developed count ries at any given time self-financing from retained earnings has been the main source of finance for firms. This was true for early industrializing countries during the initial stage of their development: in Britain, for instance, easyand relatively cheap entry to manufacturing production, coupled with its high profitability, allowed innovative entrepreneurs to finance the first steps of their growth from internal sources of capital. This remained the rule both in those countries that industrialized later without enduring acute conditions of economic backwardness (continental Europe and North Ameriea) and for the later stages of development in the early industrializers. A diachronie approach also shows that there were wide cyelical variations in self-financing. These variations reflect BANKING AND FINANCE 325 either shifts in business income (such as the conlraclion of gross profits in interwar Brilain, aggravated by the rising level of taxation) or the intensily of the investment cyele and the ensuing gap between the level of investment and firms' savings rate. In the United States, tor example, during the conglolIlerate movement of the 1960s and 1970S, financing shifted from cash to stock and then to debt. Firms' saving rates lhemselves vary according lo lheir productivity and according to the distribution of value-added between different stakeholders. If shareholders long tolerated high rates of self-financing, this has no longer been true in many developed countries since the last decade of the twentieth century. In the Uni ted States, for instance, the replacement of organizational by market control that occurred in the 1980s re sulted in an increased level of payouts to shareholders of non-financial corporations (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1997).
Whether the rate of self-financing is declining in the long run is more difficult to assess. High-quality, consistent quantitative data on self-financing are unavailable for the period before World War 11. The availability of homogenous macroeco nomic data does not allow us to give a correct account of its evolution. In France, for instance, the rate of self-financing deelined from the early twentieth century, and in spite of a sharp revival in the 1930S and 1940s, it fell again from 1950 to 1980. Does this evolulion reHect asound tendency imputable to the diversification of financing sources, or is it rather the consequence of the shifting structure of the economy (such as the rise of sectors with massive external capital require ments) or of the changing social organization of the corporate sector (such as the development of state-owned firms with low levels of profitability and unlimited ability to borrow)? What is widely agreed is that during the last decades of the twentieth century internal financing remained the dominant source of finance in all developed counlries (based mainly on depreciation and capital transfers rather lhan retained earnings) so that it is difficult to consider it as a residual factor.
But a synchronie approach shows that, even when we exelude the case of emerg ing countries where self-financing is less developed, a wide diversilY of situations can be observed. During the period from 1960 to 1985, three groups of countries can be distinguished. In the first group, which ineludes countries with high rates of investment (United States) as weil as some with lower rates (UK). self-financing is very high (equal to or higher than 100% as a percentage of fixed investment). The second group ineluding Japan, Haly, and France is characterized by low rates ofself financing. In the third group positions are less stable. In Germany, for instance, the immediate postwar years were marked by exceptionally high rates ofself-financing, compared to the pre-war era; in the succeeding period (mid-1950s-late 19605) , the strength of investment, coupled with a contraction of profits resulting from a sharp increase in wages, resulted in a decline ofself-financing. Conversely, the years 1970-5 saw a revival of these rates which left German firms among the most self-financed in the world (Straus 1988). 
INTERME DIARIES
However the years 1880 to 1930 saw the take-off of several financial markets. The emergeuce of new industries, coupled with the transformation of family flrms into public companies and the proliferation of mergers in developed countries, External finance constitutes the symmetrical counterpart to self-financing. Its com brought about a sharp increase in equity issues that reached its apogee in the 19 2 0S. position gives rise to multiple axes of differentiation among financial systems. The
In addition, turn-of-the-cen tury decades witnessed several financial innovations first is the respective share of financial markets and intermediaries. During the years (Iower denominated securities, issuance of preference shares and bonds) designed 1950 to 1980 this axis matches up relatively weil with the previous one: countries to spread the use of all kind ofsecurities. No later than 1880-1914 these innovations where firms resort more to financial markets than to intermediaries are those where rates of self-financing are high (United States, UK) while those which resort more allowed British manufacturing firms 10 diversify their sources of finance and to to intermediation than to markets are those where the share of external finance is move away from reliance on equity to debenture capital, which increased their gearing ratio (Watson 1999), though preference capital also grew rapidly and high (Japan, Prance, Italy). These parallels can be explained by the fact that the remained the most important item in the capital structure of firms. The true role creation of banks active in the field of industrial finance, which is the answer to the lack of efficient financial markets, made firms less reluctant to link the level of their played by stock markets varied from one place to another: while the LSE was used investment to that of thejr earnings. to finance investments in new assets, the New York stock exchange was used Although these differences among countries were already visible at the beginning to transfer ownership of existing assets. The "great reversal" stopped the switch from a market based largely on public ofthe twentieth century, the two sources of external finance have evolved in parallel.
securities to a more privately based market, but this shift recurred in the second half Both markets and financial intermediaries expanded rapidly from 1850 to 1913-29.
of the twentieth century. The stock market boom of the final decades of the century However this growth ended in the interwar period. During the "great reversal in the United States, UK, and the Netherlands. In several countries of the first while in the United States the fragmention of ownership among domestic house holds prevailed by 1990, in Germany and in fapan more concentrated ownership group (France, Japan) the ensuing jump recorded in the activity of financial in termediaries was driven by the deveIopment of an "overdraft economy" around the by non-financial enterprises in the first case, by financial institutions in the second) accounted for nearly one-third of total shareholdings. In spite of years 1950-80 (Aoki et al. 1994; Straus 1988) . However, by 1999, in many countries these developments, the role of new equity issues in firms' financing pattern should (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Anglo-Saxon countries) financial intermediaries exhibited lower levels of activity than in the interwar period. After the "great not be overestimated. Even in the United States, new equities represent only a small part of non-financial firms' financing (Iess than 10% of their gross finance between reversal", which they too experienced, financial markets recorded a slight recovery around 1960, but difficulties recurred so that it was not until the years 1980-2000 1970 and 1990 ). The role of the stock market today is stilliess finance of corpora te investment than Iiquidity creation; it is this liquidity that allows short-term savings that these markets really boomed, exceeding the level of 1913-38 everywhere. Under to be transformed into long-term commitments and enables the caDital market to the assumption that this evolution reflects the pattern of corporate financing, it playa significant role in corporate control. is consistent with the general account of financial deveIopment as moving first to financial intermediaries and second to financial markets. But this evolution appears
The proportion of bonds in the financing pattern of firms also varies consistently to be both recent and somewhat chaotic, not linear and ineluctable. among countries. From the 1950S onwards, bonds were important only in a small
The internal composition offinaneial markets and financial interm ediaries intro number of countries (as in the United States where their share in corporate finance duees further axes of differentiation. In spite of their early development in several exceeds that of stocks). This is not to say that bond markets are underdeveloped countries (Netherlands, UK, France), financial markets long played no signiticant e1sewhere; in developed countries the ratio of the nominal value of outstanding bonds to GDP usuallyexceeds that of market capitalization; but the bond markets role in the financing pattern of firms. Unti11914, most securities quoted on the stock either remain state-oriented as in Japan or are dominated by financial institutions exchanges were bonds issued by states and railway companies; in 1913, bonds and as in Germany (where non-financial enterprises do not directly access primarydebt markets In most countries, public banks coexist with commercial intermediaries but not in a similar proportion. Public banks include two kinds of institutions: special government banks such as mortgage institutions or industrial banks, designed to serve specific sectors; local non-profit institutions (saving and cooperative banks) designed to serve special c1asses of customers (small firms, craftmen) and to collect savings neglected by commercial banks. The first group has played an important part in certain phases of financial history, especially during periods of financial distress: in Japan, for instance, the Industrial Bank ofJapan (1902) was mobilized to support the stock exchanges of Tokyo and Osaka (1916) , to provide assistance to a wide range of troubled industries, and to finanee firms engaged in foreign investment (1918) 
and military produetion (1941) (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1997).
In France, the publie institutions that channe!ed funds (Credit Foncier de France, Credit Agricole, Credit National) have shaped the financial system in an original segmentation pattern where eaeh institution was designed to provide privileged credits to a specific seetor of the economy (Baubeau 2003) .
Since the mid-nineteenth eentury, non-profit local financial institutions played a particularly important role in those continental European countries where Table 14 .2). In fact it is these banks, not the large private universal banks in these countries, that explain why the financial system is domina ted by intermediaries. The reasons why non-profit institutions dominated the banking seetor are various. In most continental Europe countries, savings banks had been launched before commercial banks so that they benefited from a first-mover advantage. In some other regions Catalonia), savings banks developed in response to the difficulties encoun tered by commercial banks (Sudria 2006) . Everywhere the basic reasons were the support of the state and loeal authorities, the commitment of these banks to loeal eeonomies, and in some cases (Iike Germany) the development of cooperative as soeiations (Conti and Ferri 2004; Hardaeh 2004) . The support of the state and loeal authorities was originally motivated by the goals of poverty relief (savings banks) and protection of artisans and small firms from unrestricted competition and pro letarization (eooperative banks). Their effective role varied. If rural cooperatives for instanee were an efficient answer to information asymmetry in the socio-economic environment of nineteenth-century Germany, they fared less weil in different con texts like Ireland and southern Italy (Guinnane 1994). More generally Germany, where savings and cooperative banks operated more and more as universal banks, is a model oftheir good functioning. France is an opposite example since the savings colleeted by the savings banks have lang been captured by the state for unpro ductive purposes, whiJe cooperative banks after a lang period of stagnation until the 1930S experienced a rapid development but to the exclusive advantage of the agricultural sector and at the expense of commercial banking (GuesJin and Lescure 1995) .
Even Iimiting the scope of analysis to commereial banks, many axes of differ entiation can be observed. The first opposes banks operating in domestic markets to those operating abroad. The development of multinational banking occurred in two historical waves (Jones 1993). The nineteenth-century wave was led by British banks, followed in steps by some other western banks (especially French, German, and BeJgian). While in continental Europe foreign branches were founded by pre existing domestic banks, British overseas banks (like the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) were launched first by merehant houses condueting no domestic banking; overseas banks were designed to facilitate the financing of the international business of their founders through foreign exchange and acceptance services. Exeept during the years 1850 to 1870, when a lot of Anglo-European banks eame (ephemerally) into being, the large domestic clearing banks stood aside from overseas branching. It is not until1911 that they actively joined this movement, and with unequal results (suceessful in South Afriea, for instance, but not in continental Europe). Multinational banking formed apart of the large European multinational investment wave of that period; it emerged separately from more tradition al inter national banking (Le. foreign trade finance and cross-border lending) mainly car ried out by merchant bankers (such as Rothschild or Baring in London). Although the role of multinational banks in the conduct of international investment was very important, it "was relatively much greater in shorHerm trade finance and in foreign portfolio investment ofa passive nature than in the active entrepreneurial fi nancing of industry accross national borders" (Cameron and Bovykin 1991) . Banks' role in the economy to which capital was channeled (40% in the Western Hemi sphere) varied according to their own geographical origin, the host economy's stage of development (colonial empire, developing countries, and sometimes developed countries), and the opportunities offered by the latter. As Fishlow (1985) suggests, it may be that the efficacy of the investments was greater in "developmental borrow ers" (the United States, Japan, Scandinavia, British dominions) than in "revenue borrowers" (Russia, Ottoman Empire). Poreign banks' influence on the shaping of national banking systems was particularly strong in those countries where the requirements for the development of banking were lacking (Brazil, China, Middle East) (Cameron and Bovykin Pollowing a phase of stabilization during the interwar period, the expansion of multinational banking revived after World War 11. This second wave was now led American banks (in the 1960s and 1970S) and Japanese banks (in the 1980s). By creating foreign branches, US banks initially intended to accompany the growth of American multinational firms in Europe, but they rapidly extended the scope of their operations to local customers and other businesses. They were pushed in this direction by the tight regulation offinancial activity in the United States. By tapping the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets, they could alleviate the short -term financing problems genera ted by US monetary policy and escape prohibitions on universal banking of the 1934 Glass-Steagall Act (Sylla 2002). The greater openness of British policy to internationl finance, coupled with the knowledge advantage of the City in international financial services, explains why London, after a half century of relative decline, reasserted its pre-1913Ieadership.
We can also distinguish the domestic behavior of commercial banks along a number of dimensions. At an early stage of banking development, the scarcity of information obliged banks to operate within narrow networks. This led to the creation of two kinds of banks: banks founded by industrialists based on the principle of "insider lending" (with bank directors as their main borrowers), as in antebellum New England (Lamoreaux 1994), and those created by credit professionals and designed to finance bank outsiders, as in England and Wales (Newton 2001). At a subsequent stage ofdevelopment, legal and organizational axes of differentiation became increasingly crucial. These oppose first unincorporated credit houses and private bankers (such as the Rothschilds in Europe) to new joint stock banks working with a higher proportion of external resources and operating under limited liability, such as the National Provincial Bank of England (1833), the Credit Suisse (1856), the Credit Lyonnais (1863), or the Deutsche Bank (1870). The main difference between the two groups was less qualitative in nature (most of the techniques used by the new banks were weil known by the oider ones and BANKING AND FINANCE 331 in continental Europe several joint-stock banks were founded by private bankers) than quantitative and organizational (Levy-Leboyer 1976) . It was reflected in the growing activity of the new banks and the constitution of the first managerial hierarchies.
A second axis of differentiation opposes unit banks and branch networks. These two types of banks coexist in many countries but the evidence is that while the creation of national branch networks prevailed almost everywhere by 1913, a small group of countries including Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and the United States had failed to develop them. This division appeared du ring the last third of the nineteenth century when, following the British example, new joint-stock banks in continental Europe extended their branch networks. This extension, which went "hand-in-hand" with the take-off of their deposit business, was the answer to both the increased benefits of scale in r1nance and the need for bank diversirlcation revealed by the widespread r1nancial crises of the pcriod (Fohlin 2000). In the post World War II era, only the Uni ted States maintained its unit banking system in many parts of the country. At the end of the twentieth century branch banking systems prevail everywhere.
A third axis of differentiation opposes specialized and universal banks. The fact that where one type of bank prevails the other can play only a Iimited role allows us to extend this distinction between banks to a distinction between banking sys tems. Universality was the predominant form of banking organization du ring the nineteenth cenLUry in both developed and developing countries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, many private unit banks operated as universal banks, and many new joint-stock banks launched subsequently, whether they were unit banks or not, followed this model. The first experiences of modern universal banking took in Belgium and in France (Societe Generale de Belgique, Credit Mobilier), but the main successful universal banking laboratories were Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Prom these laboratories, universal banking spread over most parts of the world during the nineteenth century including continental Europe, parts of Latin America, and to a lesser cxtent even New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. In thc latter country, a number ofbanks as in New England had moved from a universal (insider lending) pattern to a specialized one, but others such as the National City Bank ofNew York had followed the opposite path. By 1913 the most eminent exception to universal banking was the UK.
Most universal banks were in fact ordinary banks. In continental Europe, priv ileged universal banks only flourished at two moments: first, during the period from 1840 to 1870, when railroadization, coupled with the growing incorporation of companics, multiplied the opportunities for more intimate connections between industrial firms and Credit Mobilier-type banks; and second, at the turn of the twentieth century, when thc start of the .second industrialization allowed German type universal banks to accompany the growth of public utilities and new industrial sectors. But few countries were concerned by these connections (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy) and even there, direct equity stakes and board representa tion were limited to a small proportion of firms. It must be added that if German universal banks wielded greater control than British banks over firms they financed, it was more through proxy voting and supervisory board positions than equity stakes; German banks did not take greater long-term equity stakes than British ones (Fohlin 2000) .
In spite of some shifts in the opposite direction (such as Paribas in France), universal banking dedined in the ensuing period . Some European banks, like the Credit Lyonnais, had star ted to move in this direction during the great depression of the late nineteenth century. The disappointing economic circum stances of the interwar per iod increased the number of banks moving towards specialization (Belgium, Italy, Greece, the United States, Japan). However this shift lasted only a few decades and the second half of the century witnessed a renewal of universal banking; "by the 1990S, most systems had reverted to something ressem bling their pre-World War I state" (Fohlin 2000) . Even the UK moved away from its steadfastly specialized system. By putting financial institutions of different types under the control of a bank holding company, the movement of concentration and conglomeration that has occurred in most developed countries since the 1970S created quasi-universal banking everywhere.
A final axis of differentiation arises from the way commercial banks matched the two sides of their balance sheet. If this axis is dosely linked with the two previous ones, it is not an automatic consequence of them. At the outbreak of World War I, continental European banks operated with more own capitalliabilities relative to deposits than those of the English-speaking world (Table 14. 3). Although the gap began to diminish at the end of the nineteenth century, it was still visible in 1913. This enabled or forced the former to keep a smaller proportion of their assets in cash or money on call and to lend out a higher proportion of their funds. On this view, continental European banks can be called low-geared in terms of the ratio of deposits to own capital and high-geared in terms of the ratio of loans and investments to cash; the opposite pattern emerges for banks in the English speaking world (Michie 2003) . But if the lending policy followed by each type of bank reflects the nature of the funds on which it relies, the correspondance is not total so that liquidity differs across countries. Continental European banks maintain lower liquidity positions than their counterparts in English-speaking countries; this is consistent with the presence or absence of a dependable lender of last resort (Feiertag and Margairaz 2003) . The example of the German and British banks suggests however that these differences should not be overestimated; using short-term coverage ratios rather than cash-deposit or cash-liabilities ratios, Fohlin (2001) finds that German banks were more "conservative" since they covered short term liabilities with short-term or liquid assets at higher rates than British banks throughout the years 1883-1913, while the policy of the Reichsbank allowed them to reduce this ratio. 
FROM THE FINANCING PATTERN OF FIRMS TO NATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Do these different sources of finance create distinct national financial systems as they appeared to do between 1950 and 1980? An answer is difficult to provide because of the lack of data concerning firms' financing patterns and the low quality of data concerning the structure of the financial sector in each country. Let us first consider the structure of the financial sector. For Rajan and Zingales (2001) , who collected data on the financial sector going back to 1913, the distinction between continental European and Anglo-American countries does not hold for the nineteenth century. In 1913 the market capitalization of firms in Belgium, Austria, and France was dose to that of the UK and far ahead of the United States; the distinction between the two groups of countries would thus be a post-World War 11 phenomenon. However this condusion is in line neither with the strong opposition visible in 1913 between continental Europe and Anglo-American count ries in terms of the level ofbanking development, as measured by Rajan and Zingales themselves, nor with the data collected by Goldsmith (1985) : when measured as a proportion of financial assets, the market value of US and British stocks is double that observed in most European countries. The share of financial institutions in total financial assets shows the reverse position, so that it is a legitimate assumption that banks played a more important part in continental Europe and in Japan than they did in the United States and UK. "The conclusion from this evidence is that there (are) long-standing and fundamental differences between the financial systems in place in different countries" (Michie 2003) .
Second, ifwe look at the banking system, we observe that in spite of considerable changes, such as in the level of concentration (Pohl et aL 2001) , the prevailing pattern of universality versus specialization was in 1913 exactly the same as in 1990. In spite of the major shifts that occurred during the "great reversal': all banking systems had reverted to their original path.
But, third, the connection between the two previous factors seems to be less strong before World War I than in the 1980s. In 1913, the rule that identifies uni versality with bank domination and specialization with market domination suffers from some exceptions. In many countries (Belgium, Germany, Austria, and even in France where the process of bank specialization was not completed) large universal banks are associated with active capital markets. This undermines the alleged iden tification of universality with bank domination. The association between universal banking and financial market maturity can be explained by the fact that, at a certain stage of development, as during the years 1850 to 1913, financial intermediaries and markets are complementary rather than competitive with one another. On the one hand, markets add a dimension that banks are not able to provide (as in the financ of railways). On the other hand, the role of the securities markets is not con fined to raising capital. The fact that securities were easily transferable made them money-market instruments so that they became an essential component of the global financial system. They were used by the banks themselves. Where banks were highly geared in term of deposits (UK, United States), banks were attracted to the securities markets, since they obtained areturn and maintained liquidity; in ad dition they provided loans to money-market participants. Where banks were less geared (Germany, Japan), banks had avested interest in building up a market for the securities that they received as collateral from their customers (Michie 2003) . The financial crises of the middle decades of the nineteenth century highlight the advantages that banks could draw from the existence of well-developed finandal markets.
More precise assessments of the existence of distinct national financial systems require us to broaden the scope of analysis. At the first level of the finandal systems, local and fragmented markets have long captured apredominant share of the total business. During the eighteenth century, France's lending system was organized around notaries, not around banks and public markets as in other countries (Hoffmann et aL 2001) ; although this system was declining after the Revolution it remained very active, especially in periods of financial difficulties. Taking local banks into account also reveals unexpected segmentations. While in BANKING AND FINANCE 335 Britain the disappearance of local banks resulted in a functional segmentation of the banking system between large specialized banks, and in Germany or Italy the segmentation was between large universal for-profit banks and non-profit local universal institutions, in France by 1913 the segmenlation was between large for profit banks on the path to specialization (the British model) and local universal banks (the German model) belonging (in contrast with Germany) to the for-profit sector (Leseure and Plessis 1999). The role of trade credit is another terra incognita. Yet, in so me countries as in France, this still represented a major component of the firms' financing pattern, related in this case to the important part played by bill discounting services (Plessis 2002) .
At the upper level of the financial system, the role of the state as a direct or indi reet source of finance should be more deeply scrutinized especially for the central period of the twentieth century when other sources were lacking. In 1949, the state financed 60 percent of the gross formation offixed capital in France, compared with 50 percent in Belgium, 40 percent in Italy, and 30 percent in the UK. Even after the withdrawal of direct financing, the French state effectively controlled 50 percent of the financing of investments between 1948 and 1965 through the "Treasury drcui!'; credit policy, and banking regulation (Quennouclle-Corre 2005) . This unorthodox system was the consequence of a poJitical consensus that a strong intervention of the state was needed to assure the country's modernization (Margairaz 1991 ).
DETERMINANTS OF VARIATIONS IN NATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
Previous analyses show how inappropriate are some of the monocausal expla nations currently proposed to account for cross-national differences in financial systems. Why for instance in 1913, with similar levels of wealth, did certain civillaw countries like Belgium and France have better-developed financial markets than so me common-Iaw ones like the United States? Obviously the low quality of legal protection provided to small shareholders in the former did not prevent financial markets from developing. Why did countries like the United States and UK with the same legal tradition and well-developed financial markets have such different banking systems during the second half of the twentieth century? Financial history suggests the influence of a lot of other determining factors.
Some of these are historical in nature and emphasize either the conditions of economic development or of state formation. According to Gerschenkron (1962) it was the relative backwardness of those countries wh ich developed after the UK that called universal banks into existence as compensatory institutions. Not only did these countries need to base their development on more capital-intensive technologies than early-industrialized nations, but they also had to compensate for the scarcity of capital, the unreHability of information, and the weakness of entreneurship, In this unfavourable environment, the role of universal banks was to channel resources into industrial investment through processes of transformation, and to provide dient firms with valuable information and strategic advice, In this perspective, it is the demand-side variables (the asset side of the banks) that determine the structure of the banking system, The strong relationship between financial institutions' structure and growth during the period and pre vious economic development supports Gerschenkron's view that the moderately industrial economies of the time relied more heavily on banks to mobilize capital than more or less developed countries while more developed countries were more market-oriented (Fohlin 2000),
In Forsyth and Verdier's account (2003) , by contrast, it is supply-side variables (the banks' liabilities side) that shape the banking system and the historical deter mining factors are not economic but political in nature. Where the state encouraged the fragmentation of the capital market (by promoting saving and cooperative banks) and hence prevented commercial for-profit banks from capturing a sub stantial share of the national deposit market, the latter were obliged to combine investment with deposit banking activities; as banks were forced to rely on their own costly resources they could not abandon the field of investment banking. Where the capital market was unified and centralized, commercial banks were able to capture a large part of the national deposit base and thus to concentrate on shorHerm lending, These differences are daimed to reflect two Hnes of political deavage, a socio-economic one (large firms versus farmers, Mittelstand) and a territorial one (center-periphery). Although quantifiable factors (such as govern ment centralization during the years provide greater power in explaining (negatively) the later development of national capital markets than the structure of banking systems (Fohlin 2000) , several individual country histories (e,g, Germany and Italy: see Deeg 2003; Poisi 2003) support the view that the existence of a strong agricultural periphery and the presence of powerfullocal non-profit institutions created the right conditions for the development of universal banks,
The major interest of these theses, whose effects on financial systems may com plement each other, is to shed some light on the initial conditions of financial development. However they explain only apart of comparative financial history. A broader explanation must take into account the multiform role played by the state. The overall influence of the state is first visible during the decades that witnessed the formation of the financial system (the end of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries), since the conditions required for an early well-functioning capital market also depended on the process of state formation. The development of financial markets in the Netherlands, Britain, and France was the result of an early financial revolution establishing widespread confidence in the public debt and the prindple of free capital markets; conversely in Germany the failure to deeply reform public finance resulted in a stunted finandal market that encouraged the development of universal banks (Jonker 2002) . Second, the role of the state was BANKING AND FINANCE 337 also visible through the regulations established during the domination of laissez faire financial regimes. The Bubble Act of 1720 and the monopoly of the Bank of England over limited liability banking may have kept English banks small and conservative until 1825, while after its removal, the absence of a reliable lender of last resort may have increased banks' reluctance to engage in risky transformation of short-term deposits into potentially illiquid assets. Similarly US legislation, by prohibiting banks from branching across state Hnes (a legislation that became tederal in 1927) and prohibiting interlocking boards of directors (the Clayton Act of 1914), prevented banks from accompanying the growth of the non-financial sector and restricted their ability to opera te as universal banks. Third, the role of regulatory factors increased in the tollowing per iod (1930 60) ; given the tendency of laissez-faire financial regimes toward instability, new financial regulations were elaborated that explain, along with the interwar eco nomic crisis, the shifts in financial developments during the "great reversal" (the weakening of the financial system and the withdrawal from universal bank ing). In many countries (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, the United States, and later France), the state enacted legislation designed to prohibit full-scale univer sal banking. In addition, several countries passed legislation aimed at imposing restrictive rules on the development of commerdal banks. In United States, the restrictive Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 aimed at limiting the scope of bank ing by discouraging mergers and branching, In France, the legislation passed in (induding the nationalization of the main commercial banks in 1945) imposed severely restrictive rules on the development of these banks, Germany followed an opposite path since the regulations established in 1931 and 1933 in troduced corporatist organization into the banking system, while the US occupy ing authorities failed to impose aUS-style financial system, By contrast with the variety of state actions undertaken in the United States to improve the efficiency of financial markets, the German tax system stunted the development of markets while a corporatist bond committee controlled access to bond markets. Through restrictions on banking activity initiated in the 1920S and state control of all securities issues and lending dedsions above a certain amount from 1937, Japan moved from an economy enjoying both a competitive banking system and a developed financial market to an economy with a dynamic but concentrated banking system and a small financial market. The Japanese state believed that it could better control capital allocation if funds were channeled through banks; not only did the main bank system by which each munitions company was assigned a major bank give them a prominent role, but, through their control of the Bond Committee, financial institutions stifled the flourishing bond market and replaced it by banking loans. In spite of the US efforts to break up this system, it was to continue until the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement gave a new impetus to international capital flows, Fourth, it is a new shift in regulatory regimes that explains the revival ofuniversal banks in the final decades of the twentieth century. The US Gramrn-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 that abolished the separation of banking and securities industries put the finishing touches to a legal evolution that began in other count ries durinl! the 1950S and 19605. Fifth, from the interwar period onwards, the state's influence was not limited to its polkies for promoting financial stability. It came also through the way the welfare state organized labor regulation, including welfare regimes. The fact that Germany and Japan have bank-based financial systems is related to their choke of solidaristk retirement systems: the absence of funded pensiQns, coupled with the relative high income equality (one consequence of the industrial relations in these countries), limits the demand for marketable securities. [f the United States is market-oriented, it is also because it has a higher level of income inequality and has opted for an individualized retirement system, which has stimulated in turn the development of a large-scale capitalized private pension system (Vitols 2001) .
Financial systems are the result of a lot of different forces and the way these forces interact vary according to the context in which they operate. No historical process that occurs in a given country can be directly reproduced elsewhere. But given the observable strength of path dependency one must be very attentive to the early conditions of financial development itself. Whatever the origins of such precedence (state formation or the timing of industrialization), some count ries were early in developing fully-fledged financial markets, while others with small and imperfect markets experienced first the emergence of large (universal) banks (Jonker 2003) . In the first case, markets stood from the start at the core of the financial system and it is their development that determined the role played by the banks; in the second case it is the banks which were the driving force (Michie 2003) . In Britain the competition of aetive finaneial markets foreed banks to coneentrate on facilitating payments and short-term credits and to specialize more and more; in Germany the advance of the Berlin universal banks and the internalization of the securities market through their control over underwriting, tradiug, brokerage, and stock-exchange supervision hindered the development of the capital market (Deeg 2003) . Once the hierarchy between banks and markets has been established, only exceptional events, such as war or economic and social crises, could modify the evolutionary path.
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE
By contrast with the economics literature, historical research has focused more on the real effects of the various types of banks than on the differences between banks and markets in the allocation of capital. Among historians the debate has long been German banks were said to have been actively involved in the finaneing and the conduct of their dients' businesses, British banks were blamed for their reluctance to commit themselves to their clients and on their obsession with liquiditv and security in the lending process. From this perspective, it seemed logical to the success of German industry to its active universal banks (Gersehenkron 19 66 ) and the relative dedine in the British economic performance to its passive clearing banks (Elbaum and Lazoniek 1986; Kennedy 1991) . Even though it could be objected that the limited industrial involvement of British banks in these years may have been due to demand-side rather than supply-side factors (Capie and Collins 199 2 ) , some authors argued that the failure of British banks after World War I to adapt their lending practices to the ehanging finaneial needs of the corporate seetor was indicative of institution al sclerosis.
This negative appraisal of specialized banks has received a new impetus through its application to a fast-growing economy, the United States in the gilded age (1880 According to Calomiris (1995) , US banks suffered from two handicaps that resulted in a high cost of capital for Ameriean industry whieh curbed the large-scale industrial investment needed at that time. Not only did the fragmented structure of American banks prevent them from benefiting from ceonomies of scale and aeeom panying their dients' growth (unlike British banks), but US banks (unlike German banks) were also speeialized so that they could not benefit from economies ofscope. Only powerful universal banks would have been able to vary the form of financing as the firm matured (direct lending then underwriting and holding of securities) and consequently would have been likely to create a long-term relationship with their customers leading to a reduction in information and monitoring costs. Even in states like IIIinois, where banks played a significant role in financing industrial expansion, this role was limited to the "adolescent" stage of the firm's Iife cyele. It was not until the 1920S, when US banks strove to operate branches and to combine, through affiliates, commercial banking, investment banking, and trust activities, that these banks were to converge (for a short time) on the universal banking pattern. These handicaps were all the more damaging, according 10 this author, insofar as the standard criticisms of universal banking (induding that these banks encourage a lack of competition among banks and firms oe that they are a factor of destabilization of the financial system and a source of conflict of interest) either lack supporting empirical evidencc or are not confined 10 this type of bank.
However, the recent tendeney of historical work has been to reassess the advan tages of each kind of bank, Ihereby smoothing the opposition between German and British banks. As far as universal banks are concerned, the early criticisms pointed out that the main dienteIe of the large German universal banks werc large, old, publicity-traded enterprises so that they were not actively involved in risky and innovative investment (Tilly 1986 (Tilly , 1998 and that by giving priority 10 the financing of heavy industries "the industrial financing of the Kreditbanken ... hampered the growth of non-agricultural output" (Neuberger and Stokes 1974) . More recent crit icisms have proceeded along two fronts (Edwards and Olgivie 1996) . In opposition to Gerschenkron's thesis of universal-bank-Ied industrialization, the first underlines the limited part played by the Iarge Kreditbanks. Holding less than 10 percent of total financial assets in 1913, large Berlin banks were only one part of the German finan cial system alongside the Reichsbank, which provided the economy with means of payment and shorHerm trade credits, and Iocal savings and cooperative banks, which granted credits to craftmen, small firms, and farmers (Ziegler 1997). 1f we consider that many regions and sectors followed a decentralized industrial develop ment pattern (based on small firms and Marshallian industrial districts), the role played by local banks may have been more crucial than that oflarge banks (Herrige! 1996; Deeg 2003) . Moreover, in the corpora te sec tor of economy where large banks were disproportionately involved, self-financing dominated, which allowed most of the large industrial firms to avoid dependence on banks. The growing replacement by 1900 of exclusive relationships with a Hausbank by multi-bank links suggests that industrial firms dominated banks rather than the reverse; the high profitability of the leading firms led to sharp competition among banks to service them. In addition, whenlarge firms turned more to external finance, as after 1895, bank loans generally did not serve as a source oflong-term finance (Edwards and Ogilvie 1996) .
The second front of criticism opposes the idea that large universal banks were ef ficient institutions for overcoming problems of informational asymmetry and firm monitoring. During the years 1880 to 1913, the presence of bank representatives on the supervisory board oflarge firms is c1aimed to have had no persistent, significant effects on investment, performance, and financial structure. Rather than a response to economic backwardness, the proliferation of formalized bank relationships on this view should be seen as a result of structural changes in the German economy (such as the increasing compIexity of the financial system or the growing preva lence of proxy voting) (Fohlin 1998 (Fohlin , 1999 . In addition, nineteenth-century German bankers seem to have been poody informed despite their intimacy with industry. Most of these assessments would also apply to the interwar period when the power of the great banks dedined and thdr ability to monitor their customers weakened (Wixforth 1995) .
While the image of the German universal banks was revised downward, the as sessment of British banks' performance became more favourable. lmproved access to banking and industrial firms' archives allowed a more accurate approach to banking practices. At the same time, British banks' role has been placed in the broader context of a financial system in which banks are confined to short-term credit provision supplementing long-term funds raised on large markets (Ross 1996) . In various ways, several studies (CottreIl1980; Watson 1996) highlight evi dence of the British banks' supporting business firms du ring the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Extensive research by Capie and Collins (1999) confirms BANKING AND FINANCE 341 this view, while emphasizing that this support was achieved through rather conser vative prudential criteria. On the one hand, the bulk of commerdal bank support for industry came in the form of short-term loans and overdrafts designed to meet cash-flow and working-capital requirements; in addition, as a result of firms' wider adoption of corporate structures and limited Iiability for shareholdings, the proportion of unsecured loans decreased. On the other hand, thanks to thc repeated renewal of overdrafts, the actual duration of loans averaged 19 months, and even though they persisted with an arm's-length approach, banks continued to support their industrial c1ients during periods of distress.
This approach to business finance was to continue during the whole of the twentieth century. Indeed, on various occasions as in the interwar years, banks were exhorted to intervene more deeply to finance the regeneration of British industry and there is some evidence of their doser involvement in c1ients' business affairs. But this was largely out of necessity (to protect their own interests) and they withdrew from any such involvement as soon as possible; c1early banks did not use their positions as creditors to implement a coordinated program of rationalization (Elbaum and Lazonick 1986) . Similarly, in the post-World War II period, banks developed greater installment credit and leasing fadlities and expanded medium term lending to the corporate sector. But for the core of their business large clearing banks remained associated with a short-term and an arm's-length approach to the business sector (Collins and Baker 2005) .
Thus, although the traditional image of British banks providing short-term secured loans is proved true, this view can no longer be considered as a sign of institutional weakness coming from the rigidity created by the growing centralization of the banking system. Instead it can be seen as a source of f1exibility and stability since the risks of banking failure were exceptionally low (Baker and Collins 2002) . The durability of the British banking model suggests also that it was a rational system. It may be an alternative solution to the problem of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and moral hazard. In relationship banking, as practiced by the Japanese keiretsu or most continental Europe banks, banks invest a lot of resources in gathering detailed privileged information on the would be borrower, in monitoring debtors, and maintaining long-term relationships with their dients. In transaction banking, as practiced by British banks, banks economize on this type of investment and do not become deeply involved in their c1ients' affairs. Rather they treat each loan as aseparate transaction and emphasize the enforcement of rules aimed at minimizing losses from e1ient default: (hey carefully screen each project, prefer short-term credits subject to frequent review, and im pose collateral requirements that guarantee the recovery of the debt in case of c1ient default (Baker and Collins 2005) · The unresolved question is the respective efficiency of these two systems in the allocation offinance. Because relationship banking relies on good information and strong e1ient monitoring, it results in committed finance that may lead to a long-term perspective and to higher levels of investment. 1 By contrast, transaction banking, because it relies on anonymous relationships, results in liquid finance (in both banks and markets) that may limit the investment horizon of firms and lead to short-term strategies. These differences mayaiso play some part in the innovation process since financia! commitment is said to be "a soda! condition permitting collective and cumulative learning to take place" (Lazonick and O'SuHivan 1997) . On these points most empirical studies are inconclusive: we need more comparative regional, industry, and firm-level research. The efficiency of each kind of bank depends on the way they are managed (Carnevali 1995) . But as shown by the Italian case, where relationship banking operated by local banks was efficient in the "Third Haly" of the center and northeast but not in the Mezzogiorno (Conti and Ferri 200 4), the efficiem.l' of each kind ofbank also depends on the context, including the cultural conlext (Eichengreen 1998) in which they operate. This pushes historians to engage more deeply in the study of banks and markets as organizations and institutions. Oppositions bclween universality and spccialization, relationship and transaction banking, non-profit and for-profit banks do not allow us to fuHy un derstand how banks and markets function, how they coordinate economic activity, how they handle information, how they shape their own proccsses of organizational learning, how they reflect and manage the various social forces they incorporate (Lamoreaux and Raff 1995) .
In addition to the study of firms and markets as organizations and institutions, thc qucstion of financial efficiency should lead us to avoid limiting thc scope of analysis to separate institutions. Banks' efficiency has to be assessed at the level of thc whole financial system. Much recent progress has been achieved by studying banks and markets "in tandem" but other institutions also have to be integrated in a complete appraisal. The example of small and medium-sized enterprisc (SME) financing illustrates this point. Small firms are more likely to depend on bank finance than large ones becausc market costs are too heavy for them. But neither relationship banks nor transaction banks are able to provide small firms with finance on the same terms as larger firms. In both cases new SMEs, the seed-corn of any industrial development, are the most affected. However, the consequences of this financial gap for industrial development and economic growth vary according to the prcsence or absence of compensatory institutions. The fact that, unlike the UK, Germany has avoided the process of deindustrialization may be attributed to thc dense network of non-profit financial institutions active in the field of SME finance (Carnevali 2005) . How thc different parts of the financial systems I FohJin herself recognizes that for the period post-l9QI high debt-equity ratios are assodated with provinciaI bank representation, so that the debt-monitormg hypothesis can not be completely rejected; similarly, for the same period, higher profit margins are positively relatcd to both provinciaI-bank and great-bank representation, so that the hypothesis that banks provide useful consultancy services can not be completely negleaed.
BANKING ANDFINANCE 343 complement one another and how this complementarity has been produced may be one of the most fruitfullines of research for the coming decades.
CONCLUSIONS
Do national financial systems converge? The question has been raist.-d for severa! periods of financial his tory. It has been hypothesized that after having converged during the years 1890 to 1914 financial systems diverged during the major part of the twcntieth century: this divergence was a result of the different regulatory solutions developed by national states. Since the 19805, it was widely expected that shifts in the international context (such as the implementation of the European Single Market) would lead to a relative convergence of financial systems. In spitc of some conspicuous common changes (such as the revival of universal banking and the replacement of banks as mobilizers of funds from economic units with surplus capital) the answer seems negative. At least in the per iod prior to the creation of the common currency no convergence can be observed between the main Euro pean financial systems. The single apparent exception is constituted by the French case and it is imputable to state policy, which consciously sought to reshape the financial system on an Anglo-Saxon model. This lack of global convergence has been "attributed to the effects of strong path dependcncies, which are in turn an outgrowth of the relationship of complementarity between the individual system components" (Schmidt et al. 2001: 
